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Deal: Torts - Sovereign Immunity of the State of Wyoming - Oroz v. Boar
TORTS-Sovereign Immunity of the State of Wyoming. Oroz v. Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County, 575 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1978).

Juan Oroz filed a complaint alleging negligence against
David Hayes to recover for injuries sustained in an
automobile accident. Hayes asserted that Carbon County
was negligent in the maintenance of a county road as an affirmative defense. Oroz then amended his complaint to name
the Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County as an
additional defendant. Carbon County joined a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Board of County Commissioners was immune from suit arising out of the
performance of governmental functions. The trial court sustained the motion to dismiss and a final judgment was
entered for the county.
On appeal Oroz urged the supreme court to abrogate the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in Wyoming.' The court
reversed the trial court, and held the immunity from tort
liability which had been judicially conferred upon counties,
municipal corporations, school districts, and other subdivisions of government, was abolished.' A footnote made it
clear that the question of the state's immunity was not considered in the decision.
In a concurring opinion Justice Raper stated: "While
the whole court does not join in saying so, at this point in
time, it appears to me that the handwriting is on the wall and
the legislature might be well advised to prepare the State
and arrange for funding of proper tort claims against it"."
The purpose of this note is to use the decision in Oroz as
a basis to consider whether the sovereign immunity of the
state can withstand a challenge in the Wyoming Supreme
Court.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF THE STATE

Most jurisdictions have made a distinction between the
sovereign immunity of the state and the governmental imCopyright©1979 by the University of Wyoming
1.
2.
3.
4.

Brief for appellant at 2, Oroz v. Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County,
575 P.2d 1155, 1158 (Wyo. 1978).
Oroz v. Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County, 575 P.2d 1155, 1158
(Wyo. 1978).
Id. at 1158.
Id. at 1161 (concurring opinion).
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munity of a municipality or other similar subdivision.5 State
immunity is broader than municipal immunity. A state has
both the governmental immunity from liability and the
sovereign immunity from suit in its courts without its consent, whereas a municipality has only the governmental immunity from liability. 6 Thus, in order to recover on a tort
claim against the state a plaintiff must overcome both the
state's substantive immunity from tort liability and the
state's immunity from suit without its consent.7
Immunity from Liability
In the past the court has left it up to the legislature to
adopt a uniform system of handling state tort liability,
either by abolishing the defense of sovereign immunity or by
providing for limited coverage by insurance.8 In Oroz, the
court exhibited an about-face in its thinking. Before Oroz the
court consistently held that any change in the doctrine of
municipal immunity would have to come from the
leglislature, through abrogation of municipal immunity9 or
authorization for the purchase of liability insurance.' 0 Yet in
Oroz the court took the ball away from the legislature by
judicially abolishing municipal immunity from tort
liability." There is no reason why the court cannot do
likewise in the area of state immunity.
The same reasons the court used in abrogating
municipal immunity in Oroz apply with equal force to the
question of state immunity. In Oroz the court recognized
that municipal immunity is not a legislative rule by virtue of
Section 8-1-101 of the Wyoming Statutes, 2 which adopts the
common law of England as the rule of decision in Wyoming. 3
The doctrine of state immunity from liability in tort is also
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618, 625 !1962).
Id. at 625.
See, Jivelekas v. City of Worland, 546 P.2d 419 (Wyo. 1976), a noteworthy case
which presents a thorough history of the development of sovereign immunity and
presents the arguments for abrogation of both the state's immunity from tort liability and its immunity from suit. The court purportedly abolished the sovereign immunity of the state. But, the opinion did not annul the state's sovereign immunity
because the case was disposed of on grounds other than the immunity question, and
the case was heard by a panel of three justices rather than by the entire court.
\
Awe v. University of Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97, 107 (Wyo. 1975).
Lutheran Hospitals & Homes Society of America v. Yepsen, 469 P.2d 409, 410
(Wyo. 1970).
Collins v. Memorial Hospital of Sheridan County, 521 P.2d 1339, 1344 (Wyo. 1974).
Oroz v. Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County, supra note 2, at 1158.
WYo. STAT. § 8-1-101 (1977).
Oroz v. Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County, supra note 2, at 1157.
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decisional law and the court has the authority to alter it." In
Oroz, the court refused to use the doctrine of stare decisis
"as a justification for the continuance of an unfair and improper rule which operates to the detriment of those who
may suffer tortious injury."" The doctrine of state immunity from tort liability is also causing a great deal of injustice
by shielding the state from liability for its torts, and stare
decisis should not be used "to perpetuate the harsh and unjust results which blind adherence to sovereign immunity
rules mandates."6
Moreover, several of the cases cited with approval in
Oroz were cases in which the state's immunity from tort
liability was annulled. 7 By basing the abrogation of
municipal tort immunity on the reasons set forth in these
cases one could argue the court implicitly approved of the
abrogation of the state's immunity from tort liability.
Another reason suggesting that the court might not
hesitate to abolish state immunity from liability if faced
with the question can be gleaned from Justice Raper's opinion in Jivelekas v. City of Worland." In an opinion designed
to point out the problems in abrogation of governmental immunity, Justice Raper stated that the legislature should
have a first adequate opportunity to establish a plan of compensation for those injured by the tortious conduct of the
state. 9 He also warned that legislative action may be well
advised." ° The legislature has had time to act and has failed
to do so. 2 Perhaps in saying the handwriting is on the wall,
Justice Raper meant that the legislature's time to act has expired; and the court should now take action.
This theory is supported by the situation in Minnesota.
In 1970 the court was asked to abolish the state's sovereign
immunity.2 The court declined and left it up to the
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Jones v. State Highway Commission, 557 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Mo. 1977).
Oroz v. Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County, supra note 2, at 1157.
Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153, 1156 (1975).
E.g. Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d
457 (1961); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, supra note 5; Hicks v. State, supra note 16;
Jones v. State Highway Commission, supra note 14.
546 P.2d 419 (Wyo. 1976).
Id. at 433 (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 434 (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Wyoming does not have a comprehensive State Tort Claims Act. One was enacted in
House Bill No. 186 of the Forty-fourth Legislature, 1977 Session, but was vetoed by
the Governor.
Johnson v. Callisto, 287 Minn. 61, 176 N.W.2d 754 (1970).
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legislature to implement a change.2" After five years of
legislative inaction the court elected to re-examine the question and abolished the tort immunity of the State of Minnesota.2 4
Furthermore, judicial action in the area of state tort immunity often prompts legislative action.2" If the court annuls
the state's defense of immunity from tort liability the
legislature may be pressed to devise a comprehensive plan to
pay for tort claims against the state.
Immunity from Suit
A more difficult question to answer is whether or not the
State of Wyoming will retain its immunity from suit which
can be altered only by the legislature. Whereas the state's
immunity from tort liability is based on the common law, 6
the state's immunity from suit has a constitutional basis in
Article I, Section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution which provides that, "Suits may be brought against the state in such
manner and in such courts as the legislature may by law
direct". 7
The first case to construe Article I, Section 828 was
Hjorth Royalty Co. v. Trustees of the University of Wyoming.2" After citing Article I, Section 810 the court stated
that such provisions are not self-executing.3 1 The court held
that no suit can be maintained against the state until consent is given by the state;32 and furthermore, it is up to the
legislature to decide whether or not the state should consent
to suits against it. 3 3 A long line of cases have upheld this interpretation so that the rule in Wyoming today is that no
suit can be maintained against the state unless the
legislature has consented to and made provision for such
suit.,4
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.
30.

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 757.
Nieting v. Blondell, 306 Minn. 122, 235 N.W.2d 597 (1975).
Minge, Governmental Immunity From Damage Actions in Wyoming, 7 Land &
Water L. Rev. (Part I - 229. Part II - 617). 657 (1972). (Hereinafter cited as Minge).
Hicks v. State, supra note 16, at 1154.
WYo. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
Wvo. CONST. art. I, § 8.
30 Wyo. 309, 222 P. 9 (1924).
WYo. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Hjorth Royalty Co. v. Trustees of the University of Wyoming, supra note 29, at 9.
Id. at 9.
Id at 11.
See, Retail Clerks Local 187 v. University of Wyoming, 531 P.2d 884 11975).
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Several other jurisdictions have a similar constitutional
provision. 5 The courts have taken two approaches in considering sovereign immunity in light'of a constitutional mandate that the legislature should provide the manner and
courts in which suits may be brought against the state. One
approach is that taken in Wisconsin and Ohio.
Wisconsin abolished state immunity from tort liability
in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee.36 The court made a distinction between governmental immunity from tort liability and
the sovereign immunity of the state from suit. 7 The court
held" that there would be substantive liability on the part of
the state, since the court nullified the defense of nonliability
for torts, but that the right of a private party to sue the state
was conditioned upon the state's consent.e
Ohio also has a constitutional provision40 almost identical to Article I, Section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution.4
In interpreting the Ohio Constitution the court held that the
purpose of the provision is to abolish the defense of governmental immunity, but that it is not self-executing. 4' The
court reasoned that the defense of immunity from liability
was no longer available to the state because of the consititutional provision, but the defense of lack of consent to suit
was still available. 3 Thus a tort action could not be brought
against the state without its consent. 4 The court concluded
by acknowledging that the judiciary could not constitutionally grant the consent to sue the state.45
Missouri has taken another approach. In Jones v. State
Highway Commission,46 the court recognized the distinction

between immunity from liability and immunity from suit,
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See, Thacker v. Board of Trustees of Ohio State University, 35 Ohio St. 2d 79, 298
N.E.2d 542, 544 (1973) for a list of jurisdictions which have an immunity theory pursuant to a constitutionalprovision.
17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
Id. at 625.
Id. at 625.
Wis. Const. art. IV, § 27 provides that the legislature shall direct by law in what
manner and in what courts suit may be brought against the state.
Ohio Const. art. I § 16 provides that suit may be brought against the state, in such
courts, and in such manner as may be provided by law.
WYo. CONST. art. I § 8.
Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736, 743 (1972).
Id. at 744.
Id. at 744.
Id. at 744.'
557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977).
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but still allowed recovery on a tort claim against the state.47
The court found sufficient legislative consent to suit in a
statute which allowed the state agency involved to sue and
be sued in its official name.48
The approach employed by the Missouri court is
available to Wyoming litigants. The contention is that Article I, Section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution49 should be
restrictively construed as merely authorizing the legislature
to regulate the procedure for and venue in actions against
the state.5" In Jivelekas, Justice Rose expressed his belief
that Article I, Section 81' furnishes recognition that suit may
be brought against the state so long as the legislature
establishes the procedure in which such litigation shall be
undertaken." In this regard the legislature has passed Section 1-35-101 of the Wyoming Statutes.53 This statute provides that any action permitted by law that is brought
against enumerated state agencies is an action against the
State of Wyoming, and that any such action must be
brought in the courts of the State of Wyoming. 4 An argument can be made that Section 1-35-101 of the Wyoming
Statutes" is -a legislative consent to suits against the state,
and can be said to have given legislative recognition to the
restrictive construction 6 of Article I, Section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution."
The Wyoming court has had an opportunity to interpret
Section 1-35-101 of the Wyoming Statutes.58 In Harrisonv.
Wyoming Liquor Commission," the plaintiff's action for
damages had been dismissed by the trial court because the
Liquor Commission was held to be exempt from suit.60 On

appeal the plaintiff contended that Chapter 35 of the Special
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 230.
Id. at 230.
WYo. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Minge at 236.
WYO. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Jivelekas v. City of Worland, supra note 18, at 429.
WYo. STAT. § 1-35-101 (1977).
The state agencies listed in Wyo. Stat. § 1-35-101 (1977) are: The Wyoming farm
loan board, board of land commissioners, state board of charities and reform, public
service commission of Wyoming, state board of equalization of Wyoming, and the
trustees of the University of Wyoming.

55.

Wyo. STAT. § 1-35-101 (1977).

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Minge at 236.
WYo. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
WYo. STAT. § 1-35-101 (1977).
63 Wyo. 13, 177 P.2d 397 (1947).
Id. at 398.
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Session Laws of 19331 was an implied consent to make the
state subject to suit.2 In writing for the Court Justice
Blume stated, "It is not necessary to determine the meaning
of the statute and we do not do so".3 He went on to state the
general rule that statutes authorizing suit against the state
are to be strictly construed.6 4 In applying this rule' 5 Justice
Blume refused to interpret the statute as authorizing suit
against an agency, the Liquor Commission, which was not
one of the state agencies specifically enumerated in Section
1-35-101 of the Wyoming Statutes. By holding as it did the
court left open the question of whether or not Section
1-35-101 of the Wyoming Statutes 67 is a legislative consent
to suit against the state agencies which are specifically
enumerated in the act.
The Wyoming court in several other cases has held that
the legislature has not consented to suit against the state, 68
but in none of these cases did the court consider the effect of
Section 1-35-101 of the Wyoming Statutes."
The Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit has recognized
the validity of the argument that Section 1-35-1017o is a
legislative consent to suit against the state. In Williams v.
Eaton,7 1 a civil rights action against the Trustees of the
University of Wyoming and the State of Wyoming; the court
considered the effect of Section 1-35-101 of the Wyoming
Statutes" on the state's immunity from suit provided by article I, section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution.7 3 The court
stated, "by law immunity of the Trustees from suit is waived
only as to such actions in the courts of the State of Wyoming"." The court held that immunity was not waived as to
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Now, WYO. STAT. § 1-35-101 (1977).
Harrison v. Wyoming Liquor Commission, supra note 59, at 399.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 399.
WYo. STAT. § 1-35-101 (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 1-35-101 (1977).
See, Retail Clerks Local 187 v. University of Wyoming, supra note 34; Hamblin v.
Arzy, 472 P.2d 933 (Wyo. 1970); Ellis v. Wyoming Game & Fish Commission, 74
Wyo. 226, 286 P.2d 597 (1955); Price v. State Highway Commission, 62 Wyo. 385,
167 P.2d 309 (1946).
WYo. STAT. § 1-35-101 (1977).
WYo. STAT. § 1-35-101 (1977).
443 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1971).
Wvo. STAT. § 1-35-101 (1977).
WYo. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Williams v. Eaton, supra note 71, at 428.
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suits against the state in the federal courts. 5 Although Williams is not mandatory authority for Wyoming courts, it is
important because it exemplifies a reasonable interpretation
of Section 1-35-101."T The federal court did interpret the
statute as a waiver of the state's immunity from suit in actions in the state courts of Wyoming. -Furthermore, since the
Trustees of the University of Wyoming are listed in the statute, Williams lends credibility to the argument that Section
1-35-101 of the Wyoming Statutes" is a legislative consent
to suit against the state agencies listed in the act.78
A final argument for the proposition that suit can be
maintained against the state is implicit in the distinction
between proprietary and governmental functions. In some
jurisdictions the state is held to be liable in actions based
upon tortious acts committed in the course of a proprietary
as distinguished from a governmental capacity. 9 One commentator" believes that several cases allow that the State of
Wyoming could be liable without legislative consent to suit
if the wrongful act occurs in the course of a proprietary
activity.' For example, in Chavez v. City of Laramie8 2 the
court cited with approval the rule that "a state exercising
governmental functions cannot be made to respond in
damages for tort ... unless it has voluntarily assumed such
liability and consented to be liable". 8 3 Whether a statement
such as this, which is dicta, would allow recovery against the
8 4
state if proprietary activities were involved is questionable.
If the state can in fact be held liable for proprietary activities it creates an anomaly in the law. It is inconsistent to
determine that the state can be liable for torts committed in
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 428.
WYo. STAT. § 1-35-101 (1977).
WYo. STAT. § 1-35-101 (1977).
On the other hand, Awe v. University of Wyoming, supra note 8,was a suit against
the Trustees of the University of Wyoming in state court, and it was dismissed. But.
the court did not decide any questions of sovereign immunity. The suit was dis-

missed because the plaintiff had failed to file a claim with the state before filing suit
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

as required by statute.
Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d 937 (1970l.
Minge at 236.
See, Chavez v. City of Laramie, 389 P.2d 23 (Wyo. 1964); Osborn v. Lawson. 374
P.2d 201 (Wyo. 1962); Ellis v. Wyoming Game & Fish Commission, supra note 68;
Harrison v. Wyoming Liquor Commission, supra note 59.
389 P.2d 23 (Wyo. 1964).
Id. at 25.
Justice Rose in Jivelekas v. City of Worland, supra note 18, at 429, and one commentator, Minge at 254, believes that the cases cited supra note 81, would allow
recovery against the state for proprietary activities even in the absence of
legislative consent.
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connection with proprietary functions, and at the same time
conclude that Article I, Section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution85 prohibits all suits against the state without legislative
consent.8" As interesting as this argument may be it is
tenuous at best in light of the fact that the state has never
been held liable for torts committed in the course of proprietary functions when sovereign immunity has been pleaded as a defense.87
CONCLUSION

It has been said that the governmental immunity of the
State of Wyoming has a foundation in both the common law
and the Wyoming Constitution. 8
As a result of Oroz the common law should no longer be
a barrier to abrogation of state immunity. The same reasons
that called for the abrogation of the tort immunity of counties and municipalities apply with equal force to the state's
immunity from tort liability. The state's immunity from
liability is court created and can be taken away by the
court. 9 The court can reasonably be expected to abolish the
state's immunity from tort liability at the first
opportunity.9 "
The constitutional foundation, contained in Article I,
Section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution,9 1 is that the state is
immune from suit in the absence of legislative consent. 2
Thus, even if the state is substantively liable for its torts the
Wyoming Constitution still presents a formidable barrier to
recovery from the state. The legislature may have consented
to suit against the state in Section 1-35-101 of the Wyoming
Statutes.9 The question of whether or not the statute is a
legislative consent to suit against at least the state agencies
specified in the act is still open as a result of Harrison.
85.

86.
87.
88.
89.

WYo. CONST. art. I, § 8.

90.

Minge at 236.
Minge at 655.
Minge at 657.
Jones v. State Highway Commission, supra note 14, at 228; Hicks v. State, supra
note 16, at 1155.
It is important to note that two of the five justices, Mr. Raper and Mr. Rose, have

91.

already expressed their willingness to abolish the state's sovereign immunity.
WYo. CONST. art. 1, § 8.

92.
93.

Hjorth Royalty Co. v. Trustees of the University of Wyoming, supra note 29, at 11.
WYo. STAT. § 1-35-101 (1977),

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1979

9

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 14 [1979], Iss. 1, Art. 10

280

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIV

Hopefully, if the court takes the initiative by abolishing
the state's immunity from liability the legislature will follow
by providing the means for an injured claimant to maintain
an action against and recover from the state. 4
The court need not be worried by the illusory threat of
unlimited liability if it abolishes state immunity. The
removal of immunity does not impose strict liability upon
the state. 5 Nor would the state be liable for acts or omissions committed in the exercise of a legislative or judicial
function.9 6 Furthermore, the state can protect itself through
liability insurance or by maintaining some sort of central
trust for the satisfaction of valid tort claims. 7
As a commentator has said, "It is suggested that the
court does have the power to abrogate the immunity doctrine and that is perhaps the most effective method of attracting legislative attention to the problem and of facilitating a
comprehensive solution.''98
MICHAEL A. DEAL

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Minge at 657.
Jones v. State Highway Commission, supra note 14, at 230.
Id. at 230.
Oroz v. Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County, supra note 2, at 1160
(Raper, Justice, specially concurring).
Minge at 662.
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